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The “Principle of Federalism” and 
the Legacy of the Patriation and 
Quebec Veto References 
Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens∗ 
“You know the thing about Canada is it’s a federal country.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Possibly more than any other case of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution2 revealed deep disagreements 
within the Supreme Court as to the nature of Canadian federalism, the 
normative consequences, if any, that can or should be drawn from the 
principle of federalism, and the interplay between formal law and 
informal law in adjudicating federalism-related cases.  
This paper argues that the Court’s rulings in federalism cases since 
the Patriation Reference, including the follow-up case of Reference re 
Amendment of Canadian Constitution,3 have not really clarified these 
areas of penumbra. In Part II, I examine the divergent conceptions of 
federalism observable in the Patriation and Quebec Veto references. I 
focus, in Part III, on the justices’ differing views on the usefulness and 
justiciability of the principle of federalism in post-Patriation Reference 
cases, notably by highlighting how they themselves use the two references 
                                                                                                             
∗  Associate Dean, Research, and Canada Research Chair in North American and Compara-
tive Juridical and Cultural Identities, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal. All rights reserved, 
Gaudreault-DesBiens, 2011. I would like to thank Geneviève Beausoleil-Allard for the most helpful 
background research she did for this paper, my colleague and friend Jean Leclair for his insightful 
comments on a preliminary version of it, and, finally, Jamie Cameron and Bruce Ryder for their 
equally helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.   
1  Chief Justice Brian Dickson in a conversation with Patrick Monahan, as quoted in Robert J. 
Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 2003), at 269.  
2  Reference re Amendment of Constituion of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 
753 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”].  
3  [1982] S.C.J. No. 101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Veto Reference”]. 
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that serve as springboards for this inquiry. Part IV then reveals, on the 
one hand, the conspicuous absence of any strong consensus on the 
normative consequences that flow, or should flow, from the principle of 
federalism, and, on the other, that the legacy of the early 1980s refer-
ences, if any, remains one of conflict rather than one of consensus. I 
conclude that in a divided society with a weak common identity such as 
Canada, this outcome is almost inevitable.4 However, I also argue that a 
common syntax of federalism, revolving around core values underlying 
the federal principle, could help buttress the quality of reasons invoked in 
support of rulings made about the formal division of powers and, as a 
result, the quality (understood here in terms of balance, consistency, and 
openness to the diversity of perspectives on federalism) of federative 
adjudication in the Canadian federation.  
An important caveat must be made as to the objective and scope of 
this paper. Indeed, it solely focuses on post-Patriation Reference cases in 
which general ideas are uttered about federalism as a principle. It thus 
ignores other cases where the analysis essentially remained in the 
technical realm of the legal interpretation of the formal distribution of 
powers, without ever referring to the federal principle. Neither does it 
seek to reveal the possibly deliberate non-dits, or silences, of such cases. 
For example, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ward5 offers a largely 
technical account, grounded on an analysis of the interplay between the 
federal jurisdiction over fisheries and the provincial jurisdiction over 
property and civil rights, of a case dealing with the sale of seal pelts. In 
overturning the Newfoundland Court of Appeal’s prior judgment through 
the adoption of this technical-legal grid, the Court ends up obscuring the 
identity concerns raised by the majority opinion in the appellate court’s 
judgment, which inform its grasp of the interplay between the competing 
federal and provincial jurisdictions at stake.6 There is thus a non-dit in 
the Supreme Court’s ruling, but this non-dit somehow speaks volumes 
since its object — in the case at bar, the iteration by Newfoundland’s 
Court of Appeal of an identity narrative represented as peculiar to the 
                                                                                                             
4  Obviously, it does not mean that conflicts are not a common feature of other less a priori 
fragmented societies. Reflecting on justice in modern democratic societies, sociologist Alain 
Touraine argues that justice results from compromises, as opposed to consensuses, his premise being 
that social conflict rather than cooperation should be the springboard of social thought. See Alain 
Touraine, Qu’est-ce que la démocratie? (Paris: Fayard, 1994), at 55, 90.  
5  Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 21, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.). 
6  R. v. Ward, [1999] N.J. No. 336, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 172 (Nfld. C.A.). 
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province and relevant in constitutional interpretation — may also hide a 
particular conception of federalism, or vision of the Canadian federation. 
The choice of not revealing and further examining such non-dits merely 
speaks to the particular objective of this paper, which is to purposively 
simplify the law of federalism so as to focus on the principle of federal-
ism as seemingly understood by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
A second caveat must be made about the temptation to situate any 
analysis of the federalism jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada 
within the old “centralization versus decentralization” debate. I intend to 
do my best to resist that temptation. First, this debate is Manichean. For 
example, some constitutional scholars, mostly from Quebec, tend to 
adopt, explicitly or not, the grid “decentralization equals good: centrali-
zation equals bad”, while others, mostly from other provinces, are 
inclined to privilege an exactly reverse but equally predictable grid. With 
all due respect, this is a bit short, intellectually speaking. Second, and 
this flows from my first observation, any conclusion about centralization 
or decentralization often implies adopting a perspective about what, 
normatively speaking, Canada should be as a nation, rather than what 
federalism may legally imply, or even demand, in the Canadian context. 
Granted, absolute neutrality is illusory in such matters, but it bears noting 
that a normative perspective on Canada and one of federalism, legally 
understood, are not exactly similar. Arguably, the former is more likely to 
lead one to systematically value decentralization or centralization over 
the other, exactly as if decentralization or centralization were abstractly 
valuable for their own sake. In my view, the claim that decentralization 
or centralization is intrinsically good is intellectually indefensible, at 
least in the legal realm, because it is not an argument, it is merely a 
belief.7 Actually, both decentralization and centralization may be appro-
priate in certain circumstances, and problematic in others. I thus take 
intellectual automatisms such as “more powers to the provinces” or 
“more powers to the federal government” to be nothing but epistemolog-
ical obstacles.8 This is why they need to be resisted, which does not mean 
                                                                                                             
7  On the weakness of the argument that decentralization is abstractly beneficial, see R. 
Howse, “Federalism, Democracy, and Regulatory Reform: A Skeptical View of the Case for 
Decentralization” in K. Knop et al., eds., Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Govern-
ments in a Changing World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), 273. 
8  On the notion of “epistemological obstacle”, see Gaston Bachelard, La formation de 
l’esprit scientifique. Contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective, 12th ed. (Paris: 
Vrin, 1983). 
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that stronger reasons leading to a “centralizing” or “decentralizing” 
outcome, as appraised from an external political perspective,9 cannot be 
entertained or even adopted. 
It is therefore in light of these two caveats that this paper should be 
read, and that any tentative conclusion on my part on whatever question 
addressed in it should be appraised. 
II. CONCEPTIONS OF FEDERALISM IN  
THE EARLY 1980S REFERENCES 
Let me briefly examine the various conceptions of federalism re-
vealed in the Patriation Reference and Quebec Veto Reference.  
Recall, first, that a little before the Patriation Reference, the Supreme 
Court had issued an advisory opinion in Reference re Legislative Author-
ity of the Parliament of Canada in Relation to the Upper House,10 where 
it entertained various arguments about Parliament’s power to unilaterally 
alter the composition and even the existence of the Senate. This hypothe-
sis was rejected, inter alia on the basis of its incompatibility with the 
“federal” character of Parliament. After commenting that the federal 
unilateral power had been confined to “federal ‘housekeeping’” matters, 
the Court noted: 
The legislation contemplated in [the Senate reference] is of an entirely 
different character. While it does not directly affect federal-provincial 
relationships in the sense of changing federal and provincial legislative 
powers, it does envision the elimination of one of the two Houses of 
Parliament, and so would alter the structure of the federal Parliament  
to which the federal power to legislate is entrusted under s. 91 of  
the Act.11 
Even before the early 1980s references, the Supreme Court had re-
jected in Blaikie the argument that the province of Quebec could legis-
late, as far as its own legislature and judiciary were concerned, against 
the letter of section 133 of the British North America Act (as the Consti-
tution Act, 1867 was then called)12 which, among other things, solely 
                                                                                                             
9  For a most useful study of such perspectives, see R. Simeon, “Criteria for Choice in 
Federal Systems” (1983) 8 Queen’s L.J. 131 [hereinafter “Simeon”]. 
10  [1979] S.C.J. No. 94, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 (S.C.C.). 
11  Id., at 65-66.  
12  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.  
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imposed bilingualism on that province and on Parliament, at the exclu-
sion of other provinces.13 More precisely, as far as Quebec was (and still 
is) concerned, this obligation applied to its legislature, its records and 
journals, the publication and printing of the Acts adopted by it, as well as 
the province’s judiciary. In a nutshell, the province sought, in a series of 
provisions of the Charter of the French Language,14 to make French the 
only official language of the legislature and courts, thus restricting the 
right to use English, or its status, in both areas. Its argument was essen-
tially grounded upon its power to amend its own constitution, but the 
Court dismissed it, arguing that even though this constitutional obligation 
of bilingualism was only imposed on Quebec and Parliament, this 
obligation enshrined a political agreement that was somehow constitutive 
of Canada itself and that transcended the interests of the particular 
province upon which these specific obligations were imposed. Accord-
ingly, these obligations were beyond the legislative reach of the Quebec 
National Assembly since section 133 was part of the “Constitution of 
Canada” rather than part of the constitution of the province.  
Federalism was not predominantly at stake in Blaikie, but the Supreme 
Court’s implicit reference, through the adoption of Deschênes J.’s histori-
cal narrative in the judgment below, to a covenant deemed to be constitu-
tive of the Canadian “federal union” certainly speaks to a certain 
conception of that union and constitutes a recognition of the partly 
contractarian dynamic inherent to federalism, which may be acknowledged 
even when formal constitutional provisions do not clearly reveal it.  
In any event, like Banquo’s ghost in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, it 
would return to the fore, and glowingly so, in the Patriation Reference.15 
The dispute at the heart of this reference was whether the federal gov-
ernment was required to secure provincial consent prior to amendments 
that would later lead to the Constitution Act, 1982,16 given the dead-
locked negotiations with provinces.  
A seven-judge majority summarily dismissed the legal argument, argu-
ing, in essence (1) that compact theories, in whatever variation, were  
not relevant, or only marginally so, to the interpretation of a British law,17 
                                                                                                             
13  Blaikie v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1979] S.C.J. 85, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Blaikie”].  
14  R.S.Q., c. C-11. 
15  Supra, note 2. 
16  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
17  Supra, note 2, at 803-804. 
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(2) that no particular normative consequence could be drawn from the 
reference in the preamble of the British North America Act to a “federal 
union” and that such consequences should instead be drawn from the 
enunciation of the normative part of the Act’s formal text18 (3) that, 
accordingly, no “standardized” conception of a federal regime could 
allow one to infer such consequences19 (4) that the internal division of 
powers does not have any external impact, and (5) that the federal 
characteristics of Canada were not jeopardized by the federal initiative 
examined by the Court. For their part, Martland and Ritchie JJ., dissent-
ing, would have found inspiration in the federal principle to draw the 
conclusion that, in the context of a constitutional amendment impacting 
on provincial powers, sovereignty in Canada was exercisable only 
through the joint expression of the federal Parliament and of the provin-
cial legislatures.20  
However, a differently constituted six-judge majority, which broadly 
understood the Canadian Constitution as a global system of rules and 
principles governing the allocation and exercise of constitutional powers 
within the Canadian state and within each of its parts, held that there was 
a constitutional convention requiring a “substantial degree of provincial 
consent” since the proposed amendments “directly affected federal-
provincial relationships in the sense of changing provincial legislative 
powers”. They found that the reason for this convention was to be found 
in the federal principle.21 Even if Canada would remain a federation were 
the amendments envisaged by the federal government adopted, that 
federation would have changed and, absent provincial consent, such a 
process went against constitutional conventions. A minority of three 
judges argued, on the contrary, that the alleged convention would unduly 
limit the sovereign powers of the federal executive and legislative 
branches,22 and that the particular type of federalism that was created by 
the British North America Act granted a form of supremacy to Parlia-
ment, as opposed to what is found in other federations. 
Thus, on the legal issue, the majority resorts to a positivist-literalist 
understanding of the British North America Act in its refusal to rely on a 
generically defined federal principle as a potential interpretive-normative 
                                                                                                             
18  Id., at 806. 
19  Id. 
20  Id., at 847. 
21  Id., at 905. 
22  Id., at 859. 
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and legally binding source.23 Three of the judges comprised in this 
majority, Laskin C.J.C., and Estey and McIntyre JJ., express a dissenting 
opinion on the conventional argument, essentially to the same effect: 
resorting to a form of Canadian exceptionalism,24 they are of the view 
that the very nature of Canadian federalism gave Parliament a pre-
eminent position within the federation. Transposing the “no standard 
federalism” argument into the conventional analysis, they refuse to draw 
normative consequences, even in the political realm, from an abstract, 
generically defined, principle of federalism.  
On the legitimacy of the use of a more abstract conception of fed-
eralism as an interpretive-normative source, we therefore get the 
following picture: three judges (Laskin, Estey and McIntyre JJ.) are 
consistently and staunchly against it in both legal and conventional 
realms, while two judges (Martland and Ritchie JJ.) support it in both 
realms. The four remaining judges (Dickson C.J.C., Beetz, Chouinard 
and Lamer JJ.) support it only in the conventional realm. Of course, 
these positions were not necessarily determinative of what all these 
judges did in later cases arising out of different contexts. Yet, two 
dominant conceptions of federalism arguably emerge from these 
various opinions, irrespective of the actual justiciability of the norma-
tive source involved. Interestingly, these two conceptions are somewhat 
reminiscent of the ones competing in the old Privy Council’s case of 
Hodge.25 
The first one, which could be characterized as Laskinian, conceives 
of the federation as a governmental structure in which the federal 
government is at the helm and where provinces are subordinated to its 
will, at least in most important respects. The primordial and transcendent 
political community is thus the pan-Canadian one, which coincidentally 
happens to be segmented into provinces. This is what could be called a 
positivist-voluntarist conception of federalism, where the will inspiring 
the creation of the polity is deduced from the formal statute creating the 
                                                                                                             
23  William R. Lederman characterized, correctly in my view, the majority opinion as “nar-
rowly positivistic and historically static”. See W.R. Lederman, “The Supreme Court of Canada and 
Basic Constitutional Amendment” in K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds., And No One Cheered: 
Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), at 180. 
24  The word “exceptionalism” was coined by sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset to describe 
one of the defining features of American political ideology. See generally Seymour Martin Lipset, 
American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996).  
25  Hodge v. R. (1883) 9 A.C. 117 (J.C.P.C.). 
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federation26 and from a predetermined conception of the federation 
where the federal government has the sole power to determine where the 
national interest lies and to define what the federal common good is. It is, 
in a nutshell, a Canadian nationalist conception of federalism. An 
alternative account of that positivist-voluntarist conception of federalism 
could be that the formal statute, as unclear as it may sometimes be, is 
nevertheless reified and instrumentalized to buttress such a nationalist 
interpretation of Canadian federalism. It is thus more than a mere 
literalist conception of federalism that is at stake here — hence, the 
emphasis on voluntarism. Indeed, the textual anchor provided by the 
Constitution Act, 1867 is way too loose to solidly ground any persuasive 
literal argument supporting that particular vision of federalism, or, for 
instance, any competing one.  
The second one, which I would call generic-historicist, envisages 
federations as structures where the federal and federated levels of 
government are co-equals, and coincidentally finds that such is the case 
with the Canadian federation in spite of some explicit provisions to the 
contrary, which are somehow treated (and then obscured) as unpleasant 
normative facts. Although this conception of federalism can hardly aspire 
to a greater level of axiological neutrality than the previous one, its 
assumption of co-equality between the two levels of government does 
not entail that legitimate decision-making implies unanimity, even where 
                                                                                                             
26  The following quotation illustrates that positivist approach:  
At the risk of undue repetition, the point must again be made that constitutionalism in a 
unitary state and practices in the national and regional political units of a federal state 
must be differentiated from constitutional law in a federal state. Such law cannot be as-
cribed to informal or customary origins, but must be found in a formal document which is 
the source of authority, legal authority, through which the central and regional units func-
tion and exercise their powers.  
 The constitution of Canada, as has been pointed out by the majority, is only in part 
written, i.e. contained in statutes which have the force of law and which include, in addi-
tion to the British North America Act (hereinafter called the B.N.A. Act), the various other 
enactments which are listed in the reasons of the majority. Another, and indeed highly 
important, part of the constitution has taken the form of custom and usage, adopting in 
large part the practices of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and adapting them to the 
federal nature of this country. These have evolved with time to form with the statutes 
referred to above and certain rules of the common law a constitution for Canada. This 
constitution depends then on statutes and common law rules which declare the law and 
have the force of law, and upon customs, usages and conventions developed in political 
science which, while not having the force of law in the sense that there is a legal en-
forcement process or sanction available for their breach, form a vital part of the constitu-
tion without which it would be incomplete and unable to serve its purpose.  
See Patriation Reference, supra, note 2, at 852-53.  
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federal-provincial relationships are affected “in the sense of changing 
provincial legislative powers”. By not finding that unanimous provincial 
consent was needed on the proposed federal amendments, the judges 
adopting that position held that legitimacy in a federation is contextual 
and ultimately raises questions of reasonableness and proportionality. 
They thus imposed limits on the potential reach of provincial federalism-
based arguments, as they had imposed limits on the hegemonic ambitions 
of the federal government when it came to amending the Constitution. 
By so doing, they affirmed a conception of the federation that took stock 
of its irreducibility, as a sovereign legal entity, to any of the orders of 
government, and to the need to prevent its instrumentalization by any 
such order of government.  
The refusal to impose provincial unanimity as a benchmark for a 
constitutional amendment of the magnitude of that envisaged implied 
that no particular province could alone pretend to have a right of veto 
over the process. As far as the convention based on the federal principle 
was concerned, the only requirement was a quantitative one of substan-
tial consent. This raised the question of the possibility of qualitative 
requirement, and that question was examined in the 1982 Quebec Veto 
Reference.27  
In this reference, Quebec argued that the province had a conventional 
veto over the amending process which was grounded on the principle of 
Canadian duality as understood in its “Quebec dimension”, that is, taking 
into consideration that several historical and contemporary social facts 
bore witness to the distinctiveness of Quebec society within the federa-
tion.28 The Supreme Court did not feel compelled to examine this 
argument, because it had earlier found that there was no evidence that the 
relevant constitutional actors had accepted or recognized a consistent 
political practice of a Quebec veto over any constitutional amendment 
affecting its powers. The problem is that by so deciding, the Court 
imposed a higher evidentiary standard than it had done in the Patriation 
Reference, where it had acknowledged that acceptance of a conventional 
rule could be merely inferred from constitutional practice. Normatively 
speaking, the Court would have arguably been on stronger ground had it 
decided to resort to the principle of federalism to reject the idea that a 
single federated unit, albeit significantly different from the others 
                                                                                                             
27  Supra, note 3.  
28  Id., at 812-13. 
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sociologically and historically, enjoyed an unqualified veto over constitu-
tional amendments. Of course, such an argument would have been 
debatable, but it would at least have been straightforward and thus less 
open to accusations of bias.29  
The Court’s opinion in the Quebec Veto Reference badly bruised its 
image in this province, to such an extent that “the general court of appeal 
for Canada instantly became ‘la Cour des Autres’ (the Others’ Court)”.30 
This came about not only as a result of what was perceived as a judicially 
created double standard, but also as a result of the Court’s implicit burial 
of Quebec’s dominant bi-national narrative of the federation, after its 
prior rejection, as “non-juridical”, of the compact theory in the Patriation 
Reference.31 For many Quebeckers, it was the beginning of the end of a 
certain Canadian dream, to paraphrase political scientist Guy Laforest,32 
and all Canadians are still living with the political-constitutional conse-
quences of this burial. That one does not personally subscribe to the 
victimization narrative that has become widespread in Quebec since 
1982 should not prevent him or her from seeing that there still is a lot of 
water in the basement of the Canadian house. 
III. AN AMBIGUOUS STANCE ON THE USEFULNESS AND 
JUSTICIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM  
AS AN INTERPRETIVE LEGAL CONCEPT 
Can the idea of federalism, envisaged from the standpoint of its nor-
mative potential, be relied upon to privilege one interpretation of the 
formal division of powers over another? As was just seen, the Patriation 
                                                                                                             
29  On these questions, see M.E. Gold, “The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in 
the Supreme Court of Canada” in E. Belobaba & E. Gertner, eds. (1985) 7 S.C.L.R. 455. For a 
strong defence of asymmetry in multinational federations, see Alain-G. Gagnon, Au-delà de la 
nation unificatrice: plaidoyer pour le fédéralisme multinational (Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis 
Autonomics, 2007). 
30  S. Choudhry & J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Frank Iacobucci as Constitution-Maker: 
From the Quebec Veto Reference, to the Meech Lake Accord and the Quebec Secession Reference” 
(2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 165, at 178. Legal philosopher Alexandre Kojève argues that the intervention of a 
disinterested third party is at the root of the very idea of justice and that it is constitutive of the law 
itself. See Alexandre Kojève, Esquisse d’une phénoménologie du droit (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), at 
24. From that perspective, the very perception of an interest on the part of the third party suffices to 
undermine its decisions and, more broadly, one’s perception of the law and of its legitimacy. 
31  Patriation Reference, supra, note 2, at 803-804. 
32  Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). 
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Reference evinced a certain malaise within the Supreme Court as to the 
usefulness and even the justiciability of the principle of federalism as a 
normative-interpretive concept. What happened next? The Supreme 
Court’s case law is inconclusive at best. Indeed, some opinions seem to 
vest this principle with a normative content, while others ignore it or 
deny its relevance.  
Two rulings clearly reject the relevance of relying on the principle of 
federalism for the purpose of interpreting a constitutional provision or for 
framing a debate about the validity of a federal unilateral action signifi-
cantly affecting provincial interests.  
In Beauregard v. Canada,33 the Supreme Court had to examine the 
constitutionality of a federal statute imposing upon superior court judges 
an obligation to contribute to their pension fund. A generic, federalism-
based argument was made in view of persuading the Court that the 
modification contemplated actually required a constitutional amendment 
supported by the appropriate degree of provincial consent. Rejecting this 
argument, the Supreme Court held that the non-ambiguous nature of the 
applicable constitutional provisions rendered irrelevant any reliance on a 
broader federalism-based argument. That being said, it bears noting that 
these constitutional provisions were only peripherally connected with 
provincial interests, and that the impact of the modification contemplated 
could not seriously be characterized as raising significant questions from 
the standpoint of the federation’s equilibrium. 
The situation was quite different in the Canada Assistance Plan Ref-
erence,34 in which the Supreme Court had to rule on the constitutionality 
of a federal statute unilaterally capping the federal government’s finan-
cial contribution to some provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan. A 
generic federalism-based argument had been made about the negative 
externalities that this unilateral federal action had imposed upon the 
provinces. Speaking for the entire Court, Sopinka J. summarily dismissed 
that argument: 
This was the argument that the “overriding principle of federalism” 
requires that Parliament be unable to interfere in areas of provincial 
jurisdiction. It was said that, in order to protect the autonomy of the 
provinces, the Court should supervise the federal government’s exercise 
                                                                                                             
33  [1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.).  
34  Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (British Columbia), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canada Assistance Plan Reference”].  
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of its spending power. But supervision of the spending power is not a 
separate head of judicial review. If a statute is neither ultra vires nor 
contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts 
have no jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of legislative power.35 
Under this view, which is largely informed by the principle of parliamen-
tary supremacy, the normative consequences of federalism begin and 
stop with the formal division of powers, and any reflection on these 
consequences should take place only where questions of constitutional 
validity are raised.36 This highly positivistic position is reminiscent of 
that adopted by the majority on the legal question in the Patriation 
Reference, notably in its reductionist approach to the supervisory role of 
the judiciary regarding the practice of federalism. Unless questions of 
validity are formally raised, the resolution of disputes regarding that 
practice is left to the political process. Justice Sopinka’s approach in the 
Canada Assistance Plan Reference is even closer to that of the three 
dissenters on the conventional issue in the Patriation Reference, for 
whom no judicially cognizable norm, be it characterized as legal or 
conventional in nature, can ever impede that process. To say the least, 
this judicial “hands-off” approach seems to entrust the political process 
with many virtues that may not always manifest themselves in the daily 
life of federations. It is as if a judicial intervention would necessarily, and 
negatively, disturb the putative harmony of this idealized political 
process. Perhaps more significantly, however, it is as if concerns for 
federalism were somehow less important than other concerns with an 
equivalent constitutional status. For example, no effort whatsoever is 
made to seriously address the possibility of a reconceptualization of the 
principle of parliamentary supremacy and of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations in light of the federal structure of Canada. 
In other cases, however, arguments grounded on the principle of fed-
eralism were accepted either by the whole Court, by a majority of the 
Court, or in dissent.  
Such was the case in R. v. S. (S.),37 where the principle of federalism 
was relied upon to counter an argument based on Canadian Charter of 
                                                                                                             
35  Id., at 567. 
36  Interestingly, a distinction here seems to be made between conflicts of jurisdictions and 
conflicts of interests, in the sense that while provincial interests may have been severely affected in 
the Canada Assistance Plan Reference, id., the provinces’ constitutional jurisdictions were not, 
strictly speaking.  
37  [1990] S.C.J. No. 66, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254 (S.C.C.).  
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Rights and Freedoms38 equality rights that sought to persuade the Court 
that the Young Offenders Act,39 which allowed provinces to set up 
rehabilitation programs, discriminated against residents of provinces that 
had refused to do so. The Supreme Court invoked federalism as a 
justification for legitimizing, as respectful of the diversity inherent to a 
federation, a federal statute which allowed for the expression of diverse 
public policies reflecting different provincial sensibilities. The Court 
added that federalism does not require uniformity, and that section 15 of 
the Charter could not be used to challenge a differential treatment based 
on the province of residence merely because it is different. In another 
case involving the Charter rather than the federal division of powers, the 
Court followed a similar logic when it upheld the constitutionality of a 
Quebec statute restricting freedom of association, notably in light of the 
province’s particular history of labour relations.40 The federal principle 
was characterized as allowing for the expression of common values 
susceptible to being implemented differently depending on the province 
involved and its particular context.  
The legal situation examined in the last two cases only incidentally 
raised questions pertaining to federalism. In contrast, these questions 
were front and centre in a 1993 case where the Supreme Court again had 
to tackle the problem of federal unilateralism, albeit in a context quite 
different from those of the Patriation Reference or of the Canada 
Assistance Plan Reference. 
In the Ontario Hydro case,41 the Court had to address the scope of 
Parliament’s unilateral and discretionary power to declare works for the 
general advantage of Canada.42 Justice Iacobucci, with whom three 
judges concurred on the legitimacy of relying on the federal principle for 
interpretive purposes in the case at bar,43 expressed the following view, 
relying on the Patriation Reference as to the relevance of the federal 
principle in that case: 
                                                                                                             
38  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c.11 [hereinafter “Charter”].  
39  S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 110.  
40  R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.). 
41  Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ontario Hydro”].  
42  Such a declaration has the effect of unilaterally transferring under federal jurisdiction the 
work which was initially under provincial jurisdiction.  
43  Supra, note 41. Justices Cory and Sopinka co-signed Iacobucci J.’s opinion, while Lamer 
C.J.C. agreed with him in a separate opinion as far as the principles were concerned. 
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The federal principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where 
the modification of provincial legislative powers could be obtained by 
the unilateral action of the federal authorities. … While the use of the 
declaratory power is not as dramatic as the unilateral amending of the 
Constitution, in my view the federal principle should be respected 
nonetheless. Parliament’s jurisdiction over a declared work must be 
limited so as to respect the powers of the provincial legislatures but 
consistent with the appropriate recognition of the federal interests 
involved.44 
However, La Forest J., writing for himself and two other judges, re-
butted his colleague’s claim that courts should narrowly construe the 
declaratory power because of the dangers it posed to Canada’s federal 
structure: 
It was argued that the declaratory power must be read narrowly to make 
it conform to principles of federalism. There is no doubt that the 
declaratory power is an unusual one that fits uncomfortably in an ideal 
conceptual view of federalism. But the Constitution must be read as it is, 
and not in accordance with abstract notions of theorists. It expressly 
provides for the transfer of provincial powers to the federal Parliament 
over certain works.  
….. 
The restricted view advanced here for the first time appears to be based 
on the danger thought to be posed to the structure of Canadian federalism 
if the courts do not confine federal power in this area. … But more 
fundamentally I think the argument evinces a misunderstanding of the 
respective roles of law and politics in the specifically Canadian form of 
federalism established by the Constitution. …  
It is the very breadth of these powers that protects against their frequent 
or inappropriate use. It was not the courts but political forces that dictated 
their near demise. They are, as was said of the power of disallowance, 
“delicate” and “difficult” powers to exercise and “will always be 
considered a harsh exercise of power, unless in cases of great and 
manifest necessity ...” … Their inappropriate use will always raise grave 
political issues, issues that the provincial authorities and the citizenry 
would be quick to raise. In a word, protection against abuse of these 
                                                                                                             
44  Id., at 404. 
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draconian powers is left to the inchoate but very real and effective 
political forces that undergird federalism.45  
Justice La Forest went on to say that he could not see in the Patria-
tion Reference anything that contradicted this last assertion: 
I see nothing in the statement in Reference re Resolution to Amend the 
Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, to the effect that a substantial 
measure of provincial consent was required before the Constitution 
could be amended that is in any way at odds with this. For the Court in 
that case made it clear that it was not within its province to enforce this 
requirement. It was, it noted, a convention. The enforcement of 
conventions lies in the political, not the legal field. They can be broken, 
and the courts have no power to prevent this, but there is a political 
price to pay. The courts have not engaged in the task of defining the 
manner in which these broad political bases of Canadian federalism 
should be protected. The Constitution has not accorded them that 
mandate. These are matters for the people. This is not to say that the 
courts do not have an important, indeed essential, role in balancing 
federalism as they go about their task of defining the nature and effect 
of those great but more subtle powers, not susceptible of definition and 
direction by those elemental political forces that undergird Canadian 
federalism.46  
This excerpt of La Forest J.’s opinion reveals that while he supports a 
reference to the principle of federalism, he seems reluctant to use it as a 
normative standard that could serve as an intrinsic limit to the heads of 
power explicitly allocated in the Constitution Act, 1867.47 It is worth 
noting in this respect that he proved less reluctant to rely on it as an 
extrinsic limit in his application of the national concern branch of 
Parliament’s power to legislate for the peace, order and good government 
to the particular facts of the Crown Zellerbach case.48 Dissenting in this 
case, he expressed the view that attributing to Parliament exclusive 
jurisdiction over environmental pollution would sacrifice the principles 
of federalism enshrined in the Constitution. Justice La Forest seemed to 
                                                                                                             
45  Id., at 370-72 (emphasis added). 
46  Id. (emphasis added). 
47  This somehow echoes his majority opinion in R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.), where he again seemed reluctant to rely on a generic conception of 
federalism and emphasized the need to understand this principle as it is reflected within the 
Canadian federal context. 
48  R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at paras. 69-
71 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Crown Zellerbach”]. 
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opine that the federal principle implies a requirement of proportionality 
and balance, both in the actions of governments and in the outcomes that 
courts reach when interpreting the division of powers in light of a claim 
with potentially drastic ramifications. 
In Crown Zellerbach, La Forest J. uses federalism as an interpretive 
principle. In Ontario Hydro, he clearly manifests a reluctance to further 
expand its reach and to grant it a full-fledged legal status. Yet, despite the 
learned judge’s concerns, it remains that a majority of judges in the latter 
case were inclined to give it such a status, thereby transforming it from a 
mere principle of political morality to a legal principle limiting the ways 
in which an undisputed constitutional power can be exercised. Under that 
view, the principle of federalism is envisaged as an interpretive legal 
principle. 
The next case where the principle of federalism played a significant 
role is the famous Quebec Secession Reference,49 which provides a 
watershed moment as far as the legal status of that principle is con-
cerned. To be first noted in this advisory opinion is the fact that a 
unanimous Supreme Court reiterates the definition of the “Constitution” 
that was adopted by the majority on the conventional question in the 
Patriation Reference.50 The Court then uses the principle of federalism as 
one of the four principles forming a super-structural analytical frame-
work for the question of secession. It observes, unsurprisingly, that 
federalism is a means to reconcile unity with diversity,51 as it grants 
federated units a sphere of autonomy that allows them to develop their 
societies.52 Federalism also institutionalizes different levels of political 
communities, all legitimized to make decisions in their respective areas 
of jurisdiction.53 As far as the particular question of Quebec is concerned, 
the Court seems eager to reinforce its legitimacy in the province after the 
Patriation Reference and the Quebec Veto Reference, by explaining the 
creation of the Canadian federation and its institutions by and large as a 
response to Quebec’s social and demographic distinctiveness within 
Canada.54 Most interesting, however, is the fact that the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
49  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”]. 
50  Id., at para. 32, citing the Patriation Reference, supra, note 2. 
51  Id., at para. 43. 
52  Id., at para. 58. 
53  Id., at para. 66. 
54  Id., at para. 59. 
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recognizes in the Secession Reference that the principles upon which it 
bases its analysis, including the federal principle, are normative and may 
in some circumstances give rise to general or specific substantive legal 
obligations and thus limit government action.55 Although it insists that 
the written text of the Constitution shall prevail over such principles,56 
the text of many constitutional provisions remains rather vague or subject 
to different interpretations, thereby creating an opening for the use of 
these principles.57 Even though the Court remains ambiguous on which 
principle can be judicially enforced, and in which circumstances,58 the 
fact remains that the Secession Reference clarifies the legal status of the 
principle of federalism and its primarily interpretive function. It shies 
away, though, from treating it as a free-standing principle that would 
alone give rise to obligations and impose duties on governmental 
actors.59  
The language used in the Secession Reference about the principle of 
federalism is broadly reminiscent of that used in the majority opinion on 
the conventional question in the Patriation Reference. One question that 
it raises, however, and that remains unanswered to this day, is to what 
extent constitutional conventions based on the principle of federalism 
and recognizable under the Patriation Reference’s analytical grid could 
now be vested with a formal legal, rather than merely political, status in 
the post-Secession Reference world. This further raises the question of 
the judiciary’s role in the recognition of breaches of such a principle. 
Could, for instance, the logic underlying the judicial recognition of 
conventions as expounded in the Patriation Reference be extended to the 
principle of federalism? More precisely, could a governmental actor ask a 
court of law for a declaratory judgment that the principle of federalism 
has been disrespected as a result of the actions of another governmental 
actor, even when no formal division of powers argument is made? This 
would again raise the question of the possibility of treating the principle 
                                                                                                             
55  Id., at para. 54. 
56  Id., at para. 53. 
57  J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Quebec Secession Reference and the Judicial Arbitra-
tion of Conflicting Narratives About Law, Democracy and Identity” (1999) 24 Vermont L. Rev. 792, 
at 825-26 [hereinafter “Gaudreault-DesBiens, ‘Quebec Secession Reference’”]. 
58  For this type of analysis, see generally J. Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten 
Constitutional Principles” (2001-2002) 14 Queen’s L.J. 389. 
59  This is also the view that was adopted about another principle, that of the protection of 
minorities, in Baie d’Urfé (Ville) v. Québec (Procureur général), [2001] J.Q. no 4821, [2001] R.J.Q. 
2520 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2001] C.S.C.R. no 524 (S.C.C.). 
94 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
of federalism as a free-standing legal principle, but with a limited 
enforceability potential when treated as such. 
That being said, post-Secession Reference cases have not dealt with 
these questions and have tended instead to treat the federal principle as 
an interpretive tool justifying distinctions between a merely legitimate 
interpretation of the division of powers and a better one. As such, it has 
almost become a conflict rule between two possible interpretations. That 
is how it was used, inter alia, in the Canadian Western Bank case,60 
where the majority opinion held, relying on that principle, that the 
interpretation of the division of powers should facilitate the legitimate 
interaction of both levels of government and support cooperative 
federalism. It also advocated a narrow interpretation of the doctrine of 
jurisdictional exclusiveness, arguing that the historical asymmetry of its 
application threatened subsidiarity, which was envisaged as consubstan-
tial to federalism.61 
The principle of federalism was also relied upon in very recent cases, 
where its interpretive status was not really challenged: Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act Reference62 and Lacombe.63 What is striking in these 
cases, however, is the extent to which deep disagreements emerged within 
the Supreme Court regarding the normative consequences to be drawn 
from the otherwise innocuous and amorphous principle of federalism. 
IV. THE ABSENCE OF ANY STRONG CONSENSUS  
ON THE NORMATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF  
THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM 
The post-Patriation Reference case law invoking the principle of 
federalism reveals the existence of some interpretive consensuses within 
the Supreme Court of Canada. However, they all stand at a very high 
level of generality, bordering on triteness. 
                                                                                                             
60  Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]; see also British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge 
Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.). 
61  Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 45. See also Quebec (Attorney General) v. Cana-
dian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at para. 44 (S.C.C.), per 
Deschamps J. 
62  Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 
457 (S.C.C.). 
63  Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”]. 
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The most important and recurrent one is that federalism should be 
understood, to the extent possible, as implying that both levels of 
government, whenever they can reasonably claim jurisdiction over one 
aspect or another of a matter, should enjoy as much legislative space as 
possible. This has primarily been done through an expansive application 
of the double aspect doctrine,64 at the expense of a strict application of 
the doctrine of jurisdictional exclusiveness.65 This interpretive trend is 
somewhat antecedent to the early 1980s references, but it has been 
reinforced since, notably through the promotion in recent cases of a more 
restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. 
This narrow interpretation seeks to prevent the creation of jurisdictional 
“enclaves”. As well, the confirmation of this doctrine’s possible applica-
tion to provincial areas of jurisdiction has theoretically restored some 
balance or symmetry between the federated and federal levels of gov-
ernment.66 However, the real normative strength67 of this revamped 
interpretation of interjurisdictional immunity remains questionable in 
light of the fact that two recent cases of 2010 blatantly contradict it. At 
the very least, they evince the resilience of an “exclusivist” conception of 
federalism as solely benefitting the federal government.68  
In spite of that, the Supreme Court’s overwhelming preference for an 
“overlapping” conception of federalism can hardly be challenged. To the 
extent that such a conception is not used to mask a quiet and unprincipled 
                                                                                                             
64  See Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommu-
nications Commission), [1989] S.C.J. No. 84, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225 (S.C.C.); Mitchell v. Peguis Indian 
Band, [1990] S.C.J. No. 63, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 (S.C.C.); Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada 
(Minister of Transport), [1992] S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.); Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J. 
No. 19, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.); NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. 
Government and Service Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “NIL/TU,O”]. 
65  This trend, which has been prevalent for at least 30 years or so, has been well docu-
mented by B. Ryder in “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: 
Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 309 and “The End 
of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial Restraint” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2006) 
34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345. 
66  See the majority opinions in Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 60, esp. at para. 45; 
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., supra, note 60, Chatterjee v. Ontario 
(Attorney General), supra, note 64; Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of 
Teamsters, [2009] S.C.J. No. 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.).  
67  On the concept of “normative strength”, see generally Catherine Thibierge et al., eds., La 
force normative. Naissance d’un concept (Paris & Brussels: L.G.D.J. & Bruylant, 2009). 
68  See Deschamps J.’s opinion in Lacombe, supra, note 63, at paras. 110 and 184-186. See 
also Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., supra, note 61. 
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take-over of the jurisdictions allocated to one level of government by the 
other, it arguably better fits with the spirit of federalism,69 which empha-
sizes the autonomy of both federal and federated levels of government 
while taking stock of the constitutional need to prevent the subordination 
of one by the other, and which acknowledges that a federation is more 
than a collection of loosely linked autonomous entities: it is in itself an 
overarching legal order, albeit an internally plural one. 
Yet, this overlapping conception of federalism merely refers to a 
broad attitude towards the interpretation of the division of powers, and 
does not say much about the normative consequences of the principle of 
federalism. The same can be said about the link between federalism and 
cooperation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested in some cases that 
cooperation is not only inherent to federalism pragmatically understood, 
but that it is to be encouraged and valued.  
In Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, the 
Court had to examine the constitutional validity of a federal-provincial 
chicken marketing scheme which permitted a federal body to delegate its 
authority to regulate the marketing of chickens, both inter-provincially 
and extra-provincially, to a provincial body. The Supreme Court dis-
missed the challenge to the constitutionality of this delegation mecha-
nism, noting that the federal-provincial agreement at stake “both reflects 
and reifies Canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and coopera-
tive flexibility”.70 Jurisdictional entanglement being the logical offspring 
of an overlapping conception of federalism, it renders cooperation 
necessary, and a “benevolent” form of constitutional scrutiny must thus 
be applied.  
The same benevolent approach is observable in the 2010 case of 
NIL/TU,O71 where the Court was asked to determine whether the labour 
relations in an agency delivering services to Aboriginal families and 
children fell under federal jurisdiction over “Indians”, even if such 
services are normally presumed to be under provincial jurisdiction. In the 
case at bar, a tripartite joint decision scheme had been set up. Justice 
                                                                                                             
69  For similar types of arguments, see D. Weinstock, “Liberty and Overlapping Federalism” 
in S. Choudhry, J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens & L. Sossin, eds., Dilemmas of Solidarity: Redistribution 
in the Canadian Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), at 167; Robert A. Shapiro, 
Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Law Press, 2009). 
70  Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 292, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). 
71  Supra, note 64.  
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Abella, speaking for a group of six justices forming a majority as to the 
reasoning (the outcome was unanimous), summarizes the working of that 
scheme as follows: 
NIL/TU,O’s operational features are painted with the same co-
operative brush. The agency exists because of a sophisticated and 
collaborative effort by the Collective First Nations, the government of 
British Columbia and the federal government to respond to the 
particular needs of the Collective First Nations’ children and families. 
This effort has resulted in a detailed and integrated operational matrix 
comprised of NIL/TU,O’s Constitution and by-laws, a tripartite 
delegation agreement, an intergovernmental memorandum of 
understanding, a set of Aboriginal practice standards, a federal funding 
directive and provincial legislation, all of which govern the provision of 
child welfare services by NIL/TU,O in a manner that respects and 
protects the Collective First Nations’ traditional values.  
By virtue of the memorandum of understanding and the tripartite 
agreement, the federal government actively endorsed the province’s 
oversight of the delivery of child welfare services to Aboriginal 
children in the province, including those services provided by 
NIL/TU,O to the Collective First Nations. I see this neither as an 
abdication of regulatory responsibility by the federal government nor 
an inappropriate usurpation by the provincial one. It is, instead, an 
example of flexible and co-operative federalism at work and at  
its best.72 
These general observations helped her conclude that: 
The essential nature of NIL/TU,O’s operation is to provide child and 
family services, a matter within the provincial sphere. Neither the 
presence of federal funding, nor the fact that NIL/TU,O’s services are 
provided in a culturally sensitive manner, in my respectful view, 
displaces the overridingly provincial nature of this entity. The 
community for whom NIL/TU,O operates as a child welfare agency 
does not change what it does, namely, deliver child welfare services. 
The designated beneficiaries may and undoubtedly should affect how 
those services are delivered, but they do not change the fact that the 
delivery of child welfare services, a provincial undertaking, is what it 
essentially does.73  
                                                                                                             
72  Id., at paras. 43-44. 
73  Id., at para. 45. 
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While advocating a more robust application of the relevant functional 
test in view of better protecting core federal jurisdictions from provincial 
encroachments, McLachlin C.J.C., and Binnie and Fish JJ., did not 
distance themselves from Abella J.’s remarks concerning cooperation. 
Yet, a benevolent form of constitutional scrutiny in contexts evincing 
intergovernmental cooperation does not mean that generic considerations 
pertaining to cooperative federalism trump the application of the federal 
division of powers. In Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community 
Services Society,74 the Supreme Court had to examine the constitutional 
validity of some provisions of the federal Controlled Drugs and Sub-
stances Act75 which, according to some parties to the dispute, unconstitu-
tionally applied to provincial health facilities. Although the case was 
ultimately decided against the federal government on the basis of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Court upheld the im-
pugned provisions from the standpoint of the division of powers. In so 
doing, it unanimously reiterated the primacy of an overlapping concep-
tion of federalism76 and the restrictive scope to be given to the doctrine 
of interjurisdictional immunity,77 noting that this doctrine created a 
tension “with the emergent practice of cooperative federalism, which 
increasingly features interlocking federal and provincial legislative 
schemes”.78 Interestingly, Insite, the safe injection facility that was bound 
to close as a result of the federal government’s withdrawal of an exemp-
tion granted under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, was 
characterized by the Court as a product of cooperative federalism,79 since 
the competent levels of governments had originally decided to exercise 
their respective jurisdictions in a way that was conducive to the creation 
and operation of the facility. However, the court’s rejection of Insite’s 
federalism-based challenge of the withdrawal of the exemption sends a 
rather clear message as to the normative reach of the principle of coop-
eration, if any: the mere fact that a policy, a program or an institution 
owes its existence to the practice of cooperative federalism does not 
shield it from the strict application of the federal division of powers. In 
this way, the Supreme Court effectively precludes the Canadian version 
                                                                                                             
74  [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS Community Services”]. 
75  S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
76  PHS Community Services, supra, note 74, at para. 62.  
77  Id., at para. 61. 
78  Id., at para. 63. 
79  Id., at para. 19. 
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of cooperative federalism from creating the “joint-decision traps” that 
have plagued more strongly integrated and interlocked federations, such 
as Germany.80  
That being said, an overlapping conception of federalism inevitably 
presupposes a shift from a radically competitive understanding of 
federalism, which often translates into strong claims of jurisdictional 
exclusiveness over narrowly defined subject matters, to a more coopera-
tive vision of federalism encouraging a shallower definition of these 
subject matters. However, it is one thing to say that such a vision now 
permeates the Supreme Court’s rhetoric; it is quite another to say that 
cooperation has been elevated to the status of a normative standard that 
would allegedly flow from the principle of federalism. Indeed, as seen 
earlier, the Canada Assistance Plan Reference81 seems to indicate the 
exact opposite. In this case, the principle of parliamentary supremacy 
easily superseded any other potential federalism-inspired claim support-
ing a formal legal obligation to cooperate or to take into consideration 
the other level of government’s interests, as opposed to jurisdictions, 
when legislating.  
It thus becomes overwhelmingly clear that the practical, political 
need for cooperation between federal actors cannot be relied upon to 
displace formal jurisdictional allocations or otherwise constitutionally 
recognized constitutional principles with a well-defined normative 
content. At best it can be argued that the Supreme Court implicitly 
accepts the existence of a rebuttable presumption of reasonable coopera-
tion between the federal government and the provinces.82 We are thus 
light years away from a formal constitutional duty to cooperate that 
would be deemed inherent to federalism. This does not mean, however, 
that cooperation is not constitutionally valued, which is markedly 
different from being compulsory. In this regard, the doctrine of comity 
                                                                                                             
80  The term “joint-decision trap” was coined by Fritz W. Scharpf in “The Joint-Decision 
Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration” (1988) 66 Public Administra-
tion 239. 
81  Supra, note 34. 
82   The roots of such a presumption can be traced back to the old Privy Council case of 
Montreal (City) v. Montreal Street Railway, [1912] J.C.J. No. 1, [1912] A.C. 333 (J.C.P.C.). I 
elaborate on this in J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Ethos of Canadian Aboriginal Law and the 
Potential Relevance of Federal Loyalty in a Reconfigured Relationship between Aboriginal and 
Non-Aboriginal Governments: A Thought Experiment”, in G. Otis & M. Papillon, eds., The 
Relational Dimension of Indigenous Governance and Federalism: Theories and Practices (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, forthcoming 2012).  
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can be construed as imposing upon provinces’ occasional obligations to 
cooperate, be it by refraining from interfering into another province’s 
affairs (“passive cooperation”), or by recognizing rulings emanating from 
another province (“active cooperation”). The doctrine of comity origi-
nates in customary international law, where it refers to obligations 
imposed upon states to respect differences between their own legal 
system and a foreign state’s legal system to which they turn for judicial 
assistance, failure by the former to respect these differences being 
characterized as a potential threat to the latter’s sovereignty. It has been 
transplanted into federal settings, because relationships between the 
various governments of a federation also raise interjurisdictional prob-
lems. There is no formal provision of the Constitution Act, 1867 enshrin-
ing comity-related obligations,83 but judicial interpretation, especially in 
cases dealing with the extra-territorial effects of provincial legislation, 
has made clear that the doctrine plays a key role in ensuring the orderly 
functioning of the federation.84 In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De 
Savoye, LaForest J., speaking for the entire Supreme Court, stated that: 
… there is really no comparison between the interprovincial 
relationships of today and those obtaining between foreign countries in 
the 19th century. Indeed, in my view, there never was and the courts 
made a serious error in transposing the rules developed for the 
enforcement of foreign judgments to the enforcement of judgments 
from sister-provinces. The considerations underlying the rules of 
comity apply with much greater force between the units of a federal 
state, and I do not think it much matters whether one calls these rules of 
comity or simply relies directly on the reasons of justice, necessity and 
convenience to which I have already adverted.85  
The Supreme Court further mentioned that the extra-territorial applica-
tion of an otherwise valid provincial legislation must be conditioned  
by “the requirements of order and fairness that underlie our federal 
                                                                                                             
83  Except, perhaps, s. 121 which, by prohibiting provinces from imposing duties and tariffs, 
could arguably be read as iterating a form of comity-related negative obligation. 
84  Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] S.C.J. No. 135, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 
(S.C.C.); Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (S.C.C.); Tolofson v. Jensen; 
Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, [1994] S.C.J. No. 110, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (S.C.C.). 
See H. Patrick Glenn, “Reconciling Regimes: Legal Relations of States and Provinces in North 
America” (1998) 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. Law 255. 
85  Morguard Investments Ltd., id., at 1098.  
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arrangements”.86 In other words, the application of such legislation 
should not unduly interfere with the interests of the province where the 
extra-territorial effects will materialize.  
Although the doctrine of comity as it applies between provinces has 
been granted full-fledged constitutional status,87 its normative potential 
appears somewhat limited as far as imposing more systematic and 
onerous cooperative duties upon Canadian federal actors is concerned. 
Indeed, it is difficult to fathom how it could be expanded and strength-
ened outside of the circumstances generally giving rise to its application. 
Thus, apart from exceptional circumstances, cooperation in the Canadian 
federation is to be legally understood as imposing, at best, obligations of 
means rather than obligations of results. This view seems comforted by 
the Supreme Court’s anticipatory refusal to ever monitor the discharge of 
the duty to negotiate identified in the Quebec Secession Reference,88 
whose potential to outgrow the admittedly exceptional context in which 
it was found to exist, except perhaps when a formal constitutional 
amendment is contemplated, appears limited.  
Another generic normative consequence derived from the principle 
of federalism appears to be that of proportionality, which is itself linked 
to a vision of the federation as both reflecting and embodying a specific 
type of political equilibrium worth preserving. The observations made in 
Binnie and LeBel JJ.’s majority opinion in Canadian Western Bank v. 
Alberta89 regarding the sometimes problematic reach of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity evidence the Court’s commitment to the 
overarching importance of proportionality as a regulatory principle 
informing the interpretation of the federal division of powers:  
Further, a broad use of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity runs 
the risk of creating an unintentional centralizing tendency in constitu-
tional interpretation. As stated, this doctrine has in the past most often 
protected federal heads of power from incidental intrusion by provincial 
legislatures. The “asymmetrical” application of interjurisdictional immu-
nity is incompatible with the flexibility and co-ordination required by 
contemporary Canadian federalism. Commentators have noted that an 
                                                                                                             
86  Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [2003] S.C.J. No. 39, 
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 63, at para. 56 (S.C.C.). 
87  Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of 
Internet Providers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 44, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, at para. 55 (S.C.C.). 
88  Supra, note 49, at paras. 88-90. 
89  Supra, note 60. 
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extensive application of this doctrine to protect federal heads of power 
and undertakings is both unnecessary and “undesirable in a federation 
where so many laws for the protection of workers, consumers and the 
environment (for example) are enacted and enforced at the provincial 
level” …. The asymmetrical effect of interjurisdictional immunity can 
also be seen as undermining the principles of subsidiarity, i.e. that deci-
sions “are often best [made] at a level of government that is not only ef-
fective, but also closest to the citizens affected” (114957 Canada Ltée 
(Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, 
2001 SCC 40, at para. 3).90 
More recently, the majority opinion in Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act91 evinces similar concerns about “[t]he need to main-
tain the balance resulting from the division of legislative powers pro-
vided for in the Constitution Act, 1867.”92  
The requirement that the actions of one level of government must not 
unduly encroach on another level’s areas of jurisdiction is obviously not 
specific to post-1980 federalism cases. However, a broader concern 
about proportionality has arguably been expressed since the late 1970s 
and early 1980s through various tests that seek, albeit imperfectly, to 
prevent outcomes upsetting the balance of federalism. The first that 
springs to mind is the one applicable where the national dimensions 
branch of the federal power to legislate for the peace, order and good 
government is invoked,93 which has indeed contributed, despite asser-
tions to the contrary,94 to making more difficult the resort to the national 
dimensions doctrine.95 A second test that to a lesser extent reflects a 
concern for maintaining the federation’s equilibrium is the one applicable 
to federal claims grounded on the general power to legislate over trade 
and commerce.96  
                                                                                                             
90  Id., at para. 45. 
91  Supra, note 62. 
92  Id., at para. 193. See also para. 246. 
93  Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 48. See also Beetz J.’s opinion in Re Anti-Inflation Act 
(Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (S.C.C.). 
94  For example, Professors Brun, Tremblay and Brouillet argue in Droit constitutionnel, 5th 
ed. (Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), at 434, that rulings such as Crown Zellerbach 
have contributed to transforming Canada into a quasi-federation the existence of which is maintained 
simply as a result of a “tolerant attitude” of the federal government towards provinces. 
95  R. v. Hydro-Québec, supra, note 47. 
96  General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “GMC”]. 
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That being said, even if one considers proportionality to broadly in-
spire the adjudication of division of powers cases, the particular norma-
tive consequences flowing from this principle remain difficult to fathom, 
absent further reference to a specific doctrine of interpretation of that 
division of powers. Moreover, one may legitimately wonder to what 
extent this broad concern for proportionality is peculiar to federalism. 
Indeed, concerns for proportionality infuse so many areas of the law that 
a scholar such as David Beatty has even argued that this principle 
represents the “ultimate rule of law”.97 Yet, there are other ways to 
address, in a more indirect way, questions pertaining to proportionality. 
An increasingly important one lies in a reference to subsidiarity, which in 
the Supreme Court’s own recent discourse, seems to be emerging as a 
principle consubstantial to federalism.  
It must first be noted that the main ideas underlying subsidiarity were 
already incorporated in the Canadian law of federalism long before the 
word “subsidiarity” was ever printed in a volume of the Supreme Court 
reports.98 Indeed, explicit references to provincial inability in cases 
dealing with Parliament’s powers to legislate for the peace, order, and 
good government of Canada in view of addressing national concerns,99 or 
to legislate under the trade and commerce power for equivalent pur-
poses,100 reflect the main ideas underlying subsidiarity. The Quebec 
Secession Reference’s vision of the federal structure as “distributing 
power to the government thought to be the most suited to achieving the 
particular societal objective having regard to this diversity”101 also 
incorporates assumptions traditionally associated with subsidiarity.  
Second, since the word “subsidiarity” made its first official appear-
ance in the Supreme Court’s case law in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, 
Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town),102 a number of important cases 
                                                                                                             
97  David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
98  P.W. Hogg, “Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers in Canada” (1993) 3 N.J.C.L. 341; 
R. Howse, “Subsidiarity in All but Name: Evolving Concepts of Federalism in Canadian Constitu-
tional Law” [hereinafter “Howse”] in H.P. Glenn, ed., Contemporary Law: Canadian Reports to the 
1994 Congress of Comparative Law (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais 1995), at 701.  
99  Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 48.  
100  GMC, supra, note 96. 
101  Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 49, at para. 58. 
102  [2001] S.C.J. No. 42, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hudson”]. In this case, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. defined the principle of subsidiarity as “the proposition that law-making and 
implementation are often best achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also 
closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and 
to population diversity” (at para. 3).  
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have evoked this principle.103 Most notably, it appears prominently in 
Canadian Western Bank, where the majority opinion holds, quoting 
Hudson, that “[t]he asymmetrical effect of interjurisdictional immunity 
can also be seen as undermining the principles of subsidiarity, i.e. that 
decisions ‘are often best [made] at a level of government that is not only 
effective, but also closest to the citizens affected’.”104  
The exact juridical status of subsidiarity remains somewhat ambigu-
ous, though. Indeed, in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, where 
the Supreme Court had to determine whether a municipality could adopt 
a by-law prohibiting aerodromes on its territory, the majority, holding 
that the said by-law encroached upon Parliament’s jurisdiction over 
aeronautics, superbly ignored the subsidiarity-based argument made in 
dissent by Deschamps J. The majority opinion in Lacombe was drafted 
by McLachlin C.J.C. on behalf of herself, Binnie, Fish, Abella, Charron, 
Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. Justice LeBel concurred with the majority as 
to the outcome of the case, but supported Deschamps J.’s views as to the 
problem posed by the majority’s use of the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity in this case. Although he does not mention subsidiarity in his 
concurring opinion, his approval of Deschamps J.’s views on interjuris-
dictional immunity, which were inspired by subsidiarity-related con-
cerns, and his own preference for resolving the case by resorting to 
federal paramountcy (as was by and large advocated in Canadian 
Western Bank), seem to indicate LeBel J.’s intellectual proximity with 
Deschamps J.’s views on subsidiarity. Interestingly, in Canadian Western 
Bank, where significant emphasis was placed on subsidiarity, the major-
ity opinion was co-signed by McLachlin C.J.C., as well as by Binnie, 
LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. Thus, five judges (excluding LeBel 
J.) who had found relevant to refer to subsidiarity in Canadian Western 
Bank, ignored it three years later. To say the least, this reveals the state of 
normative flux in which it seems caught: when should it be relied upon, 
for what purpose, and, most importantly, what does it mean?105 No clear 
                                                                                                             
103  For an interesting analysis of recent developments concerning subsidiarity, see Dwight 
Newman, “Changing Division of Powers Doctrine and the Emergent Principle of Subsidiarity” 
(2011) 74 Sask. L.R. 21 [hereinafter “Newman”].  
104  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 60, at para. 45. 
105  This uncertainty is explored by Eugénie Brouillet in “Canadian Federalism and the Prin-
ciple of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora’s Box?”, in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011)  
54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 601. 
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answer on any of these questions emerges from the post-Canadian 
Western Bank case law. 
Just a few months after Lacombe, the Supreme Court again split on 
the question of subsidiarity, but explicitly this time. In Reference re 
Assisted Human Reproduction,106 a debate arose between two groups of 
four judges as to what subsidiarity should entail in view of examining the 
constitutionality of a federal statute regulating assisted reproduction. 
Justice Cromwell, who was the swing vote in this case, did not specify 
his views on the impact of subsidiarity. The federal government 
grounded the constitutionality of that statute on Parliament’s power to 
enact criminal laws regarding the protection of public health, while the 
Quebec government contended that some of its most important provi-
sions had the effect of regulating the practice of medicine and were 
therefore infringing on provincial jurisdiction over hospitals, property 
and civil rights, and matters of a merely local nature. 
On the one hand, LeBel and Deschamps JJ., with whom Abella and 
Rothstein JJ. concurred, anchored their analysis of the interpretive 
doctrines of the division of powers within the principle-based framework 
elaborated on in the Quebec Secession Reference, which they interpreted 
as implicitly recognizing subsidiarity as a sub-principle inherent to that 
of federalism. After a further examination of the pedigree of that sub-
principle in Canadian constitutional law, they considered it to be “an 
important component of Canadian federalism”,107 and, referring to 
Hudson, gave it this meaning:  
According to this principle, legislative action is to be taken by the 
government that is closest to the citizen and is thus considered to be in 
the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns …108  
They concluded as follows on the outcome of the case and on the role of 
the principle of subsidiarity:  
In sum, the conclusion that the impugned provisions, far from falling 
under the federal criminal law power, relate instead to the provinces’ 
jurisdiction over hospitals, property and civil rights and matters of a 
merely local or private nature is self-evident. If any doubt remained, 
this is where the principle of subsidiarity could apply, not as an 
independent basis for the distribution of legislative powers, but as an 
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interpretive principle that derives, as this Court has held, from the 
structure of Canadian federalism and that serves as a basis for 
connecting provisions with an exclusive legislative power. If 
subsidiarity were to play a role in the case at bar, it would favour 
connecting the rules in question with the provinces’ jurisdiction over 
local matters, not with the criminal law power … 109 
In addition to disagreeing with their colleagues as to the outcome of the 
case, McLachlin C.J.C., and Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ., adopted a 
sharply different perspective on the relevance and meaning of subsidiar-
ity. Speaking on their behalf, McLachlin C.J.C. rejected both the idea 
that subsidiarity could be relied upon to limit the scope of a federal 
power “to preserve space for provincial regulation”, and the ensuing 
“connection argument” made by LeBel and Deschamps JJ.110 Particularly 
interesting is the Chief Justice’s understanding of the subsidiarity 
principle. She indeed seems to restrict the scope of that principle, as 
discussed in Hudson, to cases where the level of government that is 
closest to the matter regulated would be allowed, in areas of jurisdic-
tional overlap, “to introduce complementary legislation to accommodate 
local circumstances”.111 She concludes that:  
[m]ore fundamentally, subsidiarity does not override the division of 
powers in the Constitution Act, 1867. … Subsidiarity might permit the 
provinces to introduce legislation that complements the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, but it does not preclude Parliament from 
legislating on the shared subject of health. The criminal law power may 
be invoked where there is a legitimate public health evil, and the 
exercise of this power is not restricted by concerns of subsidiarity.112  
Thus, on the one hand, we have a group of four justices led by LeBel 
and Deschamps JJ. who, in line with the majority opinion in Canadian 
Western Bank, elevate subsidiarity to the status of an interpretive princi-
ple of the division of powers in general and of the scope of the jurisdic-
tions therein allocated in particular; on the other hand, we have another 
group of four justices led by McLachlin C.J.C. who, in spite of Canadian 
Western Bank, seem to understand subsidiarity as applicable only in 
                                                                                                             
109  Id., at para. 273 (emphasis added). Transparency requires me to disclose that in reaching 
that conclusion, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. referred to some of my previous work. 
110  Id., at para. 69. 
111  Id., at para. 70 (emphasis added). 
112  Id., at para. 72. 
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cases of jurisdictional overlaps and as merely referring to relations of 
complementarity between federal and provincial regulatory schemes.  
What to make of these conflicting views? Several definitions have 
been given to the principle of subsidiarity since its foundational modern 
iteration in the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.113 Most 
often, it is understood as referring to “the notion that lower levels of 
government are inherently better situated to regulate sub-political forms 
of human association or human relationships”.114 Although generally 
correct, this definition is somewhat lacking in that it seems to rest on a 
non-modifiable and univocal value judgment about the respective virtues 
of lower level and upper level governmental interventions. In my view, a 
better description of the subsidiarity principle would seek to avoid such 
univocal judgments and to actualize the meaning of the principle in the 
context of contemporary federations marked by numerous internal and 
external challenges. Under this view, subsidiarity would necessarily 
attempt to reconcile concerns for diversity and for efficiency, and to 
provide minimal procedural parameters for determining under which 
circumstances one of these values may trump the other. William Ossi-
pow’s description of the principle neatly captures its main thrust:  
The principle of subsidiarity is not univocal in designating the level of 
decision. It indicates a preferable level (the lowest one possible), which 
must be defensible from the perspective of the principles of political 
dignity and autonomy. But it also incorporates a prudential clause 
which seeks to ensure systemic safety: whenever the theoretically 
optimal level is unable to accomplish a particular task, it is then up to 
the other level to take responsibility for this task.115  
This highlights the functionalist nature of subsidiarity, which is re-
flected in one of the principle’s most important recent legal iterations in 
article 5(2) of the European Union Treaty. Although it reiterates a 
                                                                                                             
113  This was done, first, by Leo XIII (Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum (Boston: St. Paul ed., 
1891)), and then by Pius XI (Encyclical Letter, Quadragesimo anno (Boston: St. Paul ed., 1931)). 
114  Howse, supra, note 98, at 705. 
115  W. Ossipow, “Architecture Fédéraliste et Exigence de Justice” (1998) 9 Philosophie 
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preference for actions undertaken by the lowest level of government, 
article 5(2) also confirms that should this level of government be unable 
to effectively achieve certain predetermined objectives, the higher level 
of government could legitimately and legally assert jurisdiction in areas 
of concurrent jurisdiction.116 In the European context, this has led to the 
recognition that subsidiarity “has both a positive limb (the Union can 
achieve better results than the regions) and a negative limb (the member 
states are unable to achieve the objectives of the proposed action).”117 
Subsidiarity is thus understood as “a means of determining the appropri-
ate level of action, and is closely related to the concepts of necessity, 
effectiveness, proportionality, or even good government. It has been 
promoted as a means of reconciling the conflicting needs of unity and 
diversity within the EU”.118 
There is no need to examine further the particular fate of subsidiarity 
in the European Union. However, for the purposes of this paper, three 
observations can be drawn from the above. First, subsidiarity is not an 
entirely neutral principle; it does indicate a preference, which can be 
defended by resorting to considerations related to democracy, legitimacy 
and accountability. As Tocqueville noted long ago, administrative 
centralization runs the risk of reducing among the citizenry what he 
called “l’esprit de cité” resulting from the proximity (or the impression 
thereof) of governing bodies.119 This problem, however, can arguably be 
                                                                                                             
116  This article reads as follows:  
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty 
and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsi-
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1 C.M.L.R. 573. It is to be noted that reference to subsidiarity cannot be made “to question the 
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son Longman, 2002), at 173. 
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at 150. 
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alleviated, at least in part, by well-designed institutions and democratic 
processes ensuring the constant re-legitimation of such institutions.120 
Second, complementarity in the context of subsidiarity is better en-
visaged as referring to the above-mentioned objective of systemic safety, 
which boils down to allowing one level to regulate a matter when 
demonstration is made that the other cannot efficiently do it.121 As 
Dwight Newman puts it, “[a]t no stage does the principle assert a mere 
complementary power by associations closer to the individual; it con-
tains, indeed, a strong preference for the power of associations closer to 
the individual over those more distant.”122 This preference can be 
characterized as a juris tantum presumption; it can be reversed provided 
there are sufficient data for doing so. The relation of subsidiarity to 
“centralization” or “decentralization” is thus merely contingent.  
Third, all things considered, it is probably preferable to envisage the 
principle of subsidiarity as a rule of conflict whose role is to support the 
implementation of the principle of autonomy inherent to any federal 
regime. The autonomy in question, which benefits each level of govern-
ment, is merely relative, however: it is exercisable only within a broader 
juridical order — the federation — which cannot, and should not, be 
instrumentalized by any level of government for its own ends.123 The 
principle of subsidiarity’s role as a conflict rule is evinced by its use for 
determining which governmental level bears the burden of proof in a 
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situation giving rise to its application.124 As such, it precludes the highest 
level of government from arbitrarily deciding to exercise a jurisdiction 
that local governments may be in a better position to exercise.125 
A further question raised by the application of the principle of sub-
sidiarity concerns the definition to be given to the notion of “proximity”, 
which is deeply ensconced in the logic underlying this principle. This 
question is not peculiar to the Supreme Court of Canada’s musings about 
subsidiarity, but it informs the Court’s internal debates about this princi-
ple. When, in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction, LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. argue that “[i]f subsidiarity were to play a role in the case 
at bar, it would favour connecting the rules in question with the prov-
inces’ jurisdiction over local matters, not with the criminal law 
power”,126 they implicitly associate one level of government’s primary 
jurisdiction over a field envisaged globally, as opposed to the other level 
of government’s mere capacity to incidentally affect the same field, to 
the notion of proximity implied by subsidiarity. The same logic is 
discernible in Deschamps J.’s dissenting opinion in Lacombe, where she 
states that 
the governments that are closest to citizens and have jurisdiction over 
land use planning should have reasonable latitude to act where the 
central government fails to do so or proves to be indifferent. They have 
such latitude as a result, inter alia, of the narrower test for protection, 
that of impairment. In my view, not to consider the practical effect of 
the legislation in determining whether the activities have been impaired 
for the purposes of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity will 
have long-term negative consequences.127  
Here, subsidiarity is referred to as a normative vehicle through which the 
government that is deemed to be the closest to the citizens (as far as land 
                                                                                                             
124  V. Constantinesco, “Le principe de subsidiarité: un passage obligé vers l’Union eu-
ropéenne”, in L’Europe et le droit, Mélanges en hommage à J. Boulouis (Paris: Dalloz, 1991), at 41, 
quoted in Valérie Michel, Recherches sur les compétences de la communauté (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2003), at 476. 
125  If one assumes for the sake of the discussion that Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 48, and 
GMC, supra, note 96, iterate the principle of subsidiarity in the Canadian context, the characteriza-
tion of this principle as a conflict rule imposing specific evidentiary requirements highlights the 
remarkably weak evidence that was accepted by the Supreme Court in both cases.  
126  Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction, supra, note 62, at para. 273. Transparency 
requires me to disclose that in reaching that conclusion, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. referred to some 
of my previous work. 
127  Lacombe, supra, note 63, at para. 185. 
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use is concerned) is somehow given “the benefit of the doubt” when that 
government is caught in a jurisdictional dispute with the other level of 
government. Actually, it is as if the former was presumed constitutionally 
competent because of its alleged proximity to the citizens. Moreover, 
subsidiarity is relied upon to support a restrictive interpretation of a pre-
existing doctrine of interpretation, that is, interjurisdictional immunity. 
By rejecting the “connection argument” invoked by the LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction, the group 
of judges led by the Chief Justice most certainly questions the under-
standing of proximity underlying Deschamps J.’s approach in Lacombe. 
In light of the remarks above, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.’s conception 
of subsidiarity is arguably closer to the common understanding of this 
principle than that of McLachlin C.J.C. Yet, their lack of mutual under-
standing about the meaning, scope and consequences of subsidiarity as a 
principle deemed inherent to federalism only highlights the problems 
plaguing references to this broader principle since the early 1980s 
references. Indeed, even when there seems to be an agreement between 
the members of the Supreme Court as to the potential relevance of a 
particular principle associated with federalism, their views on the actual 
impact of that principle on the interpretation of the division of powers 
may vary widely,128 sometimes to the point of being incommensurable. 
The positivist-voluntarist and generic-historicist conceptions of federal-
ism that divided the members of the Court in the early 1980s still divide 
its new members today. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Long before norms collide, there are fractures which flow from culture 
and sensitivities.129  
The Patriation Reference and the Quebec Veto Reference certainly 
are two of the most important opinions ever pronounced by the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
128  An interesting illustration of this can be found in Lamer C.J.C.’s opinion in Ontario 
Hydro, supra, note 41, where he agrees with Iacobucci J.’s abstract analysis of the principle-based 
framework applicable to the case while significantly disagreeing about the application of that 
framework in the instant case.  
129  My translation of “Il y a ainsi, bien avant les collisions de normes, des fractures de la 
culture et de la sensibilité.” See Jean Carbonnier, “Variations sociologiques”, in Écrits (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2008) 908, at 910. 
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Court of Canada. They took place at a time constitutional negotiations 
were arguably a close second to hockey as Canada’s national sport. They 
also emerged out of an era when Canadians still felt that something had 
to be done to persuade Quebeckers not to leave the federation. Paradoxi-
cally, one of these opinions, the Quebec Veto Reference, further contrib-
uted to the latter’s feeling of alienation within Canada. Last, they 
revealed, if need be, deep fracture lines regarding the interpretation of 
Canadian federalism. In other words, they “haunt us still”.130 
What is their legacy? On the political front, these opinions remind us 
of a period of intense constitutional debates that shaped Canadian 
political life for the decades to come. These opinions were preceded, in 
1980, by the first referendum on Quebec sovereignty and followed by a 
second one in 1995. This last referendum was itself prompted by two 
failed attempts at amending the Constitution — the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown sagas — to undo the political damage resulting from the 
1982 patriation of the Constitution without Quebec’s approval, a process 
that was condoned by the Supreme Court in the Quebec Veto Reference. 
In this respect, the Quebec Secession Reference can arguably be read as 
an attempt to restore the Court’s battered legitimacy in the post-Quebec 
Veto Reference era before a politically important segment of its audience: 
Quebec.131 Yet, the Court’s rejection of a Quebec-centric vision of 
Canadian duality has not been formally reversed. This persisting judicial 
ambiguity, coupled with the political turmoil that followed the Meech 
and Charlottetown debacles, has arguably contributed to the deepening of 
the political rift between Quebec and the other Canadian political 
communities, a rift that manifests itself as a growing reciprocal indiffer-
ence. From the perspective of the Canada-Quebec debate and irrespective 
of one’s opinion on its possible outcomes, the Canadian federation, as it 
currently stands, sociologically speaking, can at best be characterized as 
a community of comfort.132  
                                                                                                             
130  I borrow these words from Stephen Clarkson & Christina McCall, Trudeau and Our 
Times, Vol. 1: The Magnificent Obsession (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), at 9. 
131  The use of this notion of “audience” refers to the theoretical framework elaborated by 
Chaim Perelman in his new rhetoric of law. See, inter alia, Chaim Perelman, Logique juridique, 
nouvelle rhétorique (Paris: Dalloz, 1979); Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de 
l’argumentation, 5th ed. (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2000). 
132  On this, see J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Fetishism of Formal Law and the Fate of 
Constitutional Patriotism in Communities of Comfort: A Canadian Perspective”, in J.E. Fossum, P. 
Magnette & J. Poirier, eds., Ties That Bind: Accommodating Diversity in Canada and the European 
Union (Brussels, Bern & Berlin: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009) 301.  
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As far as the law of federalism is concerned, the legacy of the early 
1980s references is also rather ambiguous. As was shown in this paper, 
the two competing conceptions of federalism that then emerged are, 
subject to minor variations, still informing judicial debates. And although 
the Patriation Reference can possibly be credited for having rekindled 
the flame of unwritten constitutionalism, albeit in the context of conven-
tions rather than law proper, no real consensus has emerged concerning 
the particular normative consequences that flow from the principle of 
federalism. Absent any broadly shared intellectual framework positing 
the parameters within which this principle is to be understood (as 
opposed to identifying its specific normative consequences in particular 
cases), it seems condemned to live a normative life marked by the 
“unbearable lightness of being”.133 In other words, trite it was; trite it 
risks remaining. 
Although one cannot reasonably expect no judicial ambiguity what-
soever on the normative consequences of the principle of federalism in a 
federation characterized by a multiplicity of often irreconcilable visions 
of that political regime, is it too much to ask for the judicial identification 
of stable parameters, which could be called sub-principles, that would 
frame decision-making when formal constitutional enactments provide 
little guidance as to how cases raising questions of federalism should be 
solved? I do not think so. I have expounded in previous papers why, in 
my view, implicit principles matter; why and when resorting to them is 
legitimate, and why outright positivist rejections of them are ontologi-
cally and hermeneutically flawed; I shall not repeat myself here.134 
Suffice it to say that it is possible, by referring to theoretical scholarship 
on federalism and to comparative law, to identify sub-principles consub-
stantial to federalism. Such sub-principles could provide, in the daily life 
of a federation, a deontic interval within which constitutional powers 
can, or should, be exercised. These sub-principles, which may have 
substantial and procedural dimensions, can be derived from the funda-
mental structural characteristics common to all federations, and adapted 
to the particular institutional features of the Canadian federation and to 
                                                                                                             
133  I am obviously referring here to Milan Kundera’s novel, The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). 
134  See, inter alia, Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Quebec Secession Reference”, supra, note 57;  
J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Underlying Principles and the Migration of Reasoning Templates: A 
Trans-Systemic Reading of the Quebec Secession Reference”, in Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration 
of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 178. 
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its political tradition. Moreover, their identification can be inspired by the 
dynamic that results from the presence of such generic and particular 
structural characteristics. As well, these sub-principles refer us back to a 
federation’s initial goals; those responsible for individuating them 
assume an obligation to act in a manner that can reasonably be character-
ized as fostering those goals, or, to put it negatively, as not unduly 
undermining the said goals. In this respect, these principles serve as 
“optimization precepts”,135 the implementation of which responds to a 
contextual logic of the possible.136 If formal constitutional provisions 
constitute the grammar of federalism in a particular federation, these sub-
principles form its syntax, and may bridge the gaps between text, subtext 
and context, as well as that between law and politics. Subsidiarity 
provides a good illustration of a procedural sub-principle of the sort 
envisaged. Using that example, I want to stress that my contention is not 
that there can always be agreement as to how subsidiarity may play out 
in a particular case; it is simply that a shared definition of that principle 
is possible if one looks at its pedigree and function, and that for the sake 
of legal consistency and intelligibility, a court such as the Supreme Court 
should strive to at least agree on the intellectual underpinnings of that 
sub-principle. This is all the more important given the absence of any 
consensual conception of federalism in Canada.  
This call for a deeper judicial reflection on the normative underpin-
nings of the principle of federalism seems particularly urgent as the 
Supreme Court is currently tackling, or is about to tackle, federalism 
cases that pit against each other values such as autonomy, diversity and 
efficiency, or interests that are pan-Canadian and provincial.137 Taking 
federalism seriously arguably imposes upon the Court the heavier burden 
of providing strong rather than merely good reasons in support of its 
federalism rulings,138 which implies making better sense of all the 
                                                                                                             
135  See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
136  G. Zagrebelsky, “Ronald Dworkin’s Principle Based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point 
of View” (2003) 1 I-CON 621, at 633. 
137  The most important is, in my view, the following: In the Matter of a Reference by Gover-
nor in Council concerning the proposed Canadian Securities Act, P.C. 2010-667 (May 26, 2010). 
138  Raymond Boudon states that:  
[t]he notion of good reasons characterizes situations where a subject agrees with a 
conclusion because he cannot find a better system of reasons than that which leads him 
to that conclusion and where he feels an intuitive doubt about the validity of that sys-
tem. In certain circumstances, this may induce him to look for better reasons. In other 
circumstances, for example if they suit him, he will live with his doubts. … One may 
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potential normative consequences of the principle of federalism. This 
highlights the penultimate objective underlying the use of such a princi-
ple-based approach to federalism: to ensure that federalism-related 
adjudication is grounded on strong reasons, whatever the outcome,139 
rather than on mere petitions of principle or deeply entrenched precon-
ceptions, and that it consciously and wilfully opens itself to diverse 
perspectives on federalism, be they put forward in the name of democ-
racy, efficiency, or of a certain conception of the political community.140  
Such a principle-based approach, I insist, is entirely compatible with 
the common law’s casuistic methodology, which is irreducible to both 
constitutional literalism and radical indeterminacy. The legacy of the 
early 1980s references commands us not to unduly raise our expectations 
as to what the Supreme Court can do in view of solving complex legal 
and political questions pertaining to the federation. But it also commands 
us not to unduly lower them either. 
                                                                                                             
have good reasons to believe in certain legends, especially when they have a functional 
value; one would not put his hands in the fire to defend them, but, in many cases, there 
is little interest in refuting them. Moreover, one is reluctant to question them. See 
Raymond Boudon, Raison, bonnes raisons (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2003), at 139 (translation). 
139  As imposing a search for strong reasons supporting a particular decision over other possible 
decisions, a principle-based approach to federalism such as that advocated in this paper seeks to 
avoid ideological determinism at all costs. It is thus neither systematically decentralist nor 
systematically centralist, and it would certainly be afflicted with a pathology should it become so, as, 
in such a situation, the very same principle would always trump all competing ones in each and 
every case. For a reflection on the importance of maintaining a balance in weighing the application 
of principles deemed inherent to federalism, see J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Irreducible Federal 
Necessity of Jurisdictional Autonomy, and the Irreducibility of Federalism to Jurisdictional 
Autonomy” in S. Choudhry, J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens & L. Sossin, eds., Dilemmas of Solidarity: 
Redistribution in the Canadian Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 185. 
140  See generally, Simeon, supra, note 9. 
 
 
